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Globalization challenges the usefulness of different paradigms of socio-cultural evolution and opens 
the possibility for their hybridization. In this paper, two paradigms of evolution, the transformational 
(Spencerian) and the variational / selectionist (Darwinian), as discerned by Fracchia and Lewontin 
(1999), are examined along with their social theoretical counterparts. Most social theories of 
development are connected to different evolutionary paradigms in different historical contexts. The 
transformational paradigm prevailed until the end of the Cold War (e.g. theories of modernization), 
and the selectionist paradigm, in various theoretical forms, thereafter (e.g. Huntington, Eisenstadt). 
Most developmental policies today prefer the selectionist paradigm in terms of the neoliberal free 
market. The transformational paradigm in development policies was predominant in the era of the 
welfare state in the West, and its counterpart in the era of the statism of the East. Sustainable 
development in a socio-cultural sense is the youngest and the least consistent policy concept, and 
it is not founded on the evolution paradigms. The concept was launched by the UN as an attempt 
at mediating, mostly on the grounds of ecological alarms, between the free-market and statist 
policies. The author considers the hybridization of these two paradigms to be a proper conceptual 
foundation of sustainable development. On this premise, he expounds the concept of a culturally 
oriented sustainable development, arguing that hybrids of developmental policies are more suitable 
for a decent survival of most countries.
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Introduction
“A businessman is a hybrid of a dancer and a calculator” (Paul Valéry).
Valery’s aphorism on businessmen was published in 1927 (Valéry 1934), 
when business-making was still an activity that was aware of its impact 
on society. In subsequent years, instead of opening the door for a market 
economy recovery, the Great Depression in Europe facilitated the rise 
of Fascism. At any rate, a businessman was situated less comfortably in 
his corporation than he is today, when corporations, mostly banks and 
financial agencies, operate with no regard to the consequences of 
their actions for the broader society (cf. Castells 1998). Traditionally, the 
economy was based on agriculture, as the backbone of the Gemeinschaft, 
a society composed mostly of peasants and artisans. Moreover, as Karl 
Polanyi put it, during most of human history the economy was embedded 
into the social tissue and “the idea of a self-adjusting market implied 
a stark Utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time 
without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would 
have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a 
wilderness” (Polanyi 2001: 2).
Valery’s metaphor of a dancer and a calculator may also be taken to 
illustrate two different meanings of the evolutionary process of society, 
which will be discussed as follows. As well as an art form, “dancing” 
may also be taken as a random, free and basically unpredictable 
movement similar to the Darwinian paradigm of the evolutionary 
process. “Calculator”, on the other hand, may be taken to illustrate a 
programmed movement with a fixed purpose – like Spencer’s and other 
teleological schemes of evolution. However, neither is sufficient to explain 
the contemporary perplexities of globalization. In this paper, the idea 
of sustainable development as a “hybrid” of these two paradigms of 
evolution will be taken as a more appropriate form of adaptation and 
survival for most societies.
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The concepts related to development
Prior to discerning the specific advantages of the idea of a culturally 
oriented sustainable development, I will clarify the key terms of relevance 
along with their different contexts. Firstly, evolution and development, 
although they literally mean the same, have different historical trajectories 
(cf. Wuketits and Antweiler 2004). Development originates from the Western 
Enlightenment era and is close to the teleological idea of “progress”. 
“Progressist” evolutionists are, for example, Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx, 
regardless of their substantial differences in other theoretical aspects.
Today, development is mainly a policy concept with a penchant for the 
free-market agenda. It was born in the aftermath of World War II, when 
the American government launched a project of international economic 
assistance to underdeveloped countries. Meanwhile, the project, along 
with a parallel Soviet project of economic assistance to underdeveloped 
countries in its own geopolitical sphere, was grounded due to an obviously 
permanent gap between the developed and the underdeveloped (cf. 
Human Development Report 2013). In such a predicament, development 
became a catchphrase for business elites in developed countries and 
their allied elites in underdeveloped countries (cf. Fine 2002).
In the most accepted version of science, evolution is a synonym for the 
work of Charles Darwin. Unlike Spencer and Marx, he rejected the idea of 
progress and applied his naturalistic concept to humans as well.1 Darwin’s 
central argument about the survival of the fittest through selection 
constitutes the (neo)evolutionary social theory (Runciman 1989; 2006), 
although not mainstream sociology (cf. Runciman 2005).
Furthermore, from the 1980s onward, globalization primarily designates 
the worldwide expansion of economic markets, as well as large-scale 
operations of corporations worldwide. This expansion entails some new 
political, military, demographic (e.g. migrations) and cultural processes 
1 “For my own part I would as soon be descended from that heroic little monkey, who braved his dreaded enemy in 
order to save the life of his keeper, or from that old baboon, who descending from the mountains, carried away in 
triumph his young comrade from a crowd of astonished dogs - as from a savage who delights to torture his enemies, 
offers up bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide without remorse, treats his wives like slaves, knows no decency, and 
is haunted by grossest superstitions” (Darwin /1882/ 2002: 619).  
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(e.g. the growth of cultural industries) (cf. Held and McGrew 2007). These 
processes challenge the explanatory potential of both paradigms of 
evolution.
Finally, sustainable development, and culturally sustainable development 
in particular, are the most recent and least consistent policy concepts, 
launched by the UN/UNESCO (cf. http://www.uncsd2012.org/history.
html). The adoption of principles of sustainable development corresponds 
to a variety of economic interests and cultural traditions of the member 
states (Duxbury and Gillette 2007). This simultaneously represents both the 
strength and the weakness of the concept. The weakness lies in the fact that 
the concept is too abstract to be implemented in individual countries. Its 
strength, on the other hand, is that it opens up the possibility of combining 
different paradigms of evolution/development, while undercutting their 
extreme versions, i.e. the free market struggle for survival and the total 
transformation of society without retention of anything from the past.
Failures of global development without global 
mechanisms of coordination
Third world countries have been entitled to American assistance in 
order to move away from their backwardness (Omar 2012). Meanwhile, 
the whole enterprise is compromised due to the increasing poverty, 
deterioration of health conditions and poor educational opportunities 
in most countries (cf. UN Global Poverty Statistics 2006). Very often, 
however, this grim picture is concealed behind a standard presentation 
of data in terms of methodological nationalism. For instance, 
developmental gaps within the USA or within Burkina Faso are not as 
big as the gaps between the two countries (see Human Development 
Report 2013). Nevertheless, developmental problems can be solved 
on the nation-state level to a progressively decreasing degree. On 
the other hand, there is no global government or equivalent world 
organization whose policies would be aimed at closing the global 
gaps. Meanwhile, policy-makers in most underdeveloped countries 
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frame their policies by the “shock therapy” doctrine that imposes free-
market policies, alleged to be the only cure for economies exhausted 
by those same free-market policies (cf. Klein 2007). As a substitute for 
lacking mechanisms on the global level, the contemporary global 
marketplace is ultimately protected by Western and allied military 
forces.
These global malfunctions fit Darwin’s selectionist paradigm. The 
outcomes of development may be explained as a product of merciless 
selection in the incessant struggle for survival and hegemony. At the 
same time, neoclassical social science, and economics in particular, 
does not provide plausible recommendations for market failures. 
Instead, market failures are treated as inevitable and as equivalents 
to natural disasters.
Such a formation of developmental thought is particularly inadequate 
for peripheries. Both functionalist authors, such as Shils (1975), and 
Marxist authors, such as Amin (1990), see the periphery as a negative 
of the centre. The periphery lacks any major resource of power, from 
private consuming wealth2 to know-how. The same gap is replicated in 
natural sciences and high-tech production (cf. Bürkner and Matthiesen 
2007) and in social sciences (Hicks 2013; Katunarić 2011).
Another result of such development is that all sectors become 
increasingly elitist, including parliament, allegedly the “last bastion” 
of (representative) democracy, which in fact functions as a lever of 
small, yet most powerful, groups. At the same time, large corporations 
in the West collaborate with non-democratic regimes, such as in Saudi 
Arabia or China. Nevertheless, both democratic and non-democratic 
regimes advocate the enrichment of the rich and the deepening of 
socio-economic inequalities, ostensibly as the motor of development. 
In peripheral countries, in particular, the new elites discard state 
intervention in economic affairs, unless such interventions are already 
agreed upon as part of the corruptive chain. Also, there is a growing 
tendency to replace civil administration with a network of military-
police outposts, controlled by big corporations. The latter, thus, 
2 Amin sees an alternative to capitalism in the periphery in autocentric development, which produces “means of 
production” and “mass consumer goods”, and refrains from luxury goods and exports (Amin 1990: 193).
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behave like feudal lords in the pre-absolutist era in Europe, when the 
power of the kings, as forerunners of the modern state, was weak.
Generally, unlike modern nation-states in the West, which succeeded in 
establishing some democratic political standards, the global mutant is not 
created by (pro)democratic movements, but by contingencies of free-
market globalization, without accompanying regulative mechanisms that 
operated in nation-states. Is this an inevitable evolutionary outcome?
The two paradigms of socio-cultural evolution
An idea of socio-cultural evolution emerged decades before Darwin’s The 
Origin of Species in Adam Smith’s laudations to the market economy as 
the playground for the selection of the best qualities of products (cf. Hayek 
1979). Another idea of evolution appeared, a few years before Darwin’s, in 
Spencer’s work. He argued that everything in the living world evolves and 
that the process unfolds from simple to complex entities. Concurrently, 
each individual passes through a process of transformation: from its origin to 
its end, from birth to death (cf. Fracchia and Lewontin 1999). This tenet fits 
Spencer’s assumption of the linear process of social evolution, in which the 
military society, as a less complex and basically despotic society, turns into 
a peaceful and liberal industrial society. Thus, a new society replaces an old 
society completely.
Darwin, on the other hand, introduced the variational paradigm of evolution. 
Here, individuals have different properties, and the population bearing these 
properties in uneven proportions does not depend on individual change. 
As Fracchia and Lewontin put it, for Darwin developmental changes in 
the individual organism, with all its variations, including birth, maturing and 
death, are not mirrored in the ensemble: “/I/t is that the forces of change 
internal to [an] organism, leading to production of variant individuals, are 
causally random with respect to the external forces that influence the 
maintenance and spread of those variants in the population. Many are 
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called, but few are chosen” (Fracchia and Lewontin 1999: 61).3
Marx’s theory, for instance, is closer to Spencer’s than Darwin’s paradigm 
of evolution.4 Marx takes it that capitalism replaces feudalism completely, 
which reminds of Weber’s ideal types. By analogy, socialism, for Marx, should 
replace all elements of capitalism (with the exception of progress in science 
and technology). Figuratively, socialism is to capitalism, or capitalism is to 
feudalism, what airplane is to car and bicycle, respectively. This basically 
agrees with Spencer’s terms of transformation.
Nevertheless, Spencer’s theory is not a trademark of social theory today. 
Rather, social theory is becoming more pluralistic, with a tendency towards 
combining the selectionist with the progressist agenda. Before discussing 
the idea of sustainable development as a major alternative of the policy 
agenda, let us recall a few remarkable works which brought social theory 
closer to the Darwinian paradigm. One is the work of anthropologist 
Marshal Sahlins, who rejects the idea of transformational evolution. Rather, 
he sees the diversity in the evolution of life, from protozoa to mammals, 
also as being fundamental in the evolution of culture and society. As much 
as he recognizes the developmental differences between traditional and 
modern societies, he warns against the modernistic bias. Sahlins argues 
that the failure of a culture is most probably the result of its success! Well 
adapted culture is one-sided, its design is specific and its environment 
narrowly specialized: the “more adapted a culture is, [the] less capable of 
change it is” (cited in: Kaplan and Manners 1972: 51). Sahlins also remarks 
that developed societies consume a lion’s part of the total energy.5 
3 Unlike Fracchia’s and Lewontin’s approach, which is focused on the relevance of Darwinism in cultural anthropology, 
this paper is focused on the sociological relevance of Darwinism and Spencerianism as regards post-World–War-
II developments in the West and the East, that are characterized by divergence and, subsequently, convergence 
between capitalism and socialism by virtue of building a welfare state which would, ideally speaking, balance 
between private needs and public goods. Theoretically, the idea of the welfare state may be taken as a forerunner of 
the idea of sustainable development, since the latter also calls for a compromise between apparently irreconcilable 
interests.
4 There is an anecdote about the failed communication between Karl Marx and Charles Darwin. Marx sent his 
Capital (the 1st volume) to Darwin, but never received a response from him. Although Marx appreciated Darwin’s 
work, his regard of Darwin was ambiguous. On the one hand, he admired Darwin’s scientific rigor, on the other, 
he expressed his reservation, stating that Darwin applied the rule of the stock-exchange to the world of nature (cf. 
Varoufakis 2008).
5 This has to do with the bias of “higher cultures”: “No one culture has a monopoly on or even necessarily more 
kinds of adaptive improvements, and what is selectively advantageous for one may be simply ruinous for another. 
Nor are those cultures that we might consider in general evolutionary standing necessarily more perfectly adapted 
to their environments than lower. Many great civilizations have fallen in the last 2,000 years, even in the midst of 
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Consequently, the most developed are least capable of change. So, 
Sahlin’s work represents a rare case of a “humanistic” socio-cultural 
Darwinism.
A remarkable work in the historical sociology of evolution, based on 
Darwinian selectionism, is the work of Walter G. Runciman (second 
volume of his A Treatise on Social Theory, published in 1989).6 He defines 
social evolution in terms of Darwin’s paradigm, i.e. non-teleologically, as 
a moving away and not toward. Hence, history as evolution consists of a 
neverending set of different processes - stagnations, revolutions, rebellions, 
turning-points, catastrophes, dead-ends, etc. - with no meaningful 
direction. Accordingly, “evolution is an incessant competition… (often 
very violent) … between rival armies, classes and beliefs”. This concurs with 
Darwin’s account: “/F/rom the war of nature, from famine and death, the 
most exalted objects which we are capable of conceiving, namely the 
production of higher animals, directly follows.” (both quotations are taken 
from Runciman 1989: 449).
Runciman’s approach corresponds to liberal policies of development, 
for they leave no possibility – for example through planning – to redirect 
development. This implication also follows the selectionist paradigm, for 
there is nothing in nature that resembles governance.7
Another remarkable theoretical work in accordance with the Darwinian 
paradigm is Eisenstadt’s seminal essay Multiple Modernities (Eisenstadt 
2002). He puts forward an idea of a plural modernism, which means 
that Western, Chinese, Indian, Muslim, Japanese and other national or 
regional developments, including Islamic fundamentalism, follow different 
paths. This corresponds with Darwin’s “variations” within a general type 
of development, which in this case is modernity. Yet, Eisenstadt denies 
that his concept of “multiple modernities” is akin to Huntington’s “clash 
of civilizations”, for different paths of development do not necessarily 
lead to collisions. On the other hand, Eisenstadt’s meaning of modernity 
6 In 2006 Runciman published a book entitled The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection (Runciman 2006), in 
which he presented his approach explicitly as selectionist.
7 Note that advocates of the theory and politics of post-development (e.g. Douglas Lummis, Gilbert Rist, Deepak 
Lal) also oppose the social engineering and managerialism of the welfare-state. As Nederveen Pieterse points 
out, “there is an elective affinity between neo-liberalism and development agnosticism of post-development” 
(Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 120).
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is as much relativistic as Huntington’s. This is especially important to 
note where human rights are concerned. Eisenstadt interprets human 
rights as a cultural, rather than trans-cultural phenomenon and sees 
modern development basically as a multi-linear process. Yet, how can 
human rights be understood as a “multi-linear” process? Would different 
understandings and practices in this regard meet somewhere in the future? 
Eisenstadt allows that any path of modern development is capable of self-
correction (Eisenstadt 2002: 24). Yet, he does not explain exactly what this 
means. It seems that in the case of human rights, the Darwinian approach 
faces ethical, rather than analytical controversies. It is clear that human 
rights are violated almost everywhere, but in some regions of the world 
the human rights rhetoric and legislation are even discarded as a Western 
imperialistic invention, which is taken as a pretext for oppression against 
people with different beliefs. If there are no universalistic norms of behaviour 
in the non-human natural world, this does not mean that they are not worth 
being established in the human world, in the name of protecting human life 
and its habitats. As much as the selectionist assumption applied to religious 
fundamentalism, to racism or to sexism produces major exclusions in society, 
the selectionist assumption applied to market fundamentalism also leads to 
a massive exclusion of unemployed persons, whose opportunities for finding 
new jobs are increasingly diminished. Obviously, the selectionist paradigm 
needs to be complemented with the transformational paradigm and some 
universalistic ethos, in order to serve as an important dimension of modern 
development, and ensure the creation of a sustainable world society.
Contemporary development in light of the two 
evolutionary paradigms
In the aftermath of World War II, up until the beginnings of the 1980s, 
welfarism and mass industrial production were trademarks in the West 
(Fordism) and the East (statism). Both regimes demonstrated varieties of 
transformational evolution. At the same time, they represented themselves 
as the end(s) of history. A further implication of this political eschatology is 
that it makes any new epoch impossible. Instead, the real, existing regimes 
can be recycled or expanded infinitely.
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In the 1980s, with the end of the Cold War ideologies, such a prophesized 
era followed, based on neo-liberalism, i.e. the recycling of classical 
economic liberalism. Neo-liberalism is much closer to Darwin’s selectionism 
and multi-linear development than it is to Spencer’s transformationalism, 
based on the harmonization of individual competition and cooperation, 
as well as the unilinear development toward a fairer and post-industrial 
society. Similarly to early capitalism, neo-liberal capitalism coexists with a 
variety of regimes, such as crony capitalism, patrimonialism, mono-party 
dictatorship and monarchism, and tolerates the increasing economic 
gap, the incurable occurrences of poverty and unemployment and 
the hyper-production of commodities well (cf. Ziegler 2005). It is also no 
coincidence that contemporary mass culture imageries increasingly 
celebrate heroes and narratives based on medieval traditions.8
When taking into account the ongoing processes of development, 
Darwin, Runciman, and even Weber and the positivists might say that the 
state of the art of today’s development reflects the evolutionary course 
in terms of selectionism. Accordingly, among different populations only a 
few are successful. On the other hand, for non-Darwinists in social theory 
the present condition of development is an intended consequence 
of selectionist-oriented scientists and policy-makers. For the former, 
who are closer to transformationalism, the modernistic project, which 
culminates with the welfare state, aspires to certainty and security and 
thus approaches a solution of the problem of development on the 
global level. In contrast, neoliberalism embraces uncertainty and risk as 
a “creative opportunity” (Sörensen and Söderbaum 2012: 13 et passim.). 
Thus, the policy of material safety and protection has been replaced 
by politics focused on resilience. Resilience represents a euphemism in 
relation to continuous global disaster management in which (military) 
interventions become normal practice. Even ideas and policies of 
sustainable development are pressured by the imperative of resilience. 
“/B/uilding resilient subjects presupposes… a world of constant exposure 
to… catastrophe” (Sörensen and Söderbaum 2012: 14). The bottom line of 
this criticism focuses on the growing economic instability in the world and 
the proliferation of wars – for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Ukraine, etc. – as interdependent phenomena. 
8 A good part of popular fiction is impregnated with non- or anti-egalitarian subjects - from varieties of the masters of 
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Perhaps, such admonitions of a global catastrophe, still based on a few 
instances of war, are exaggerated. One may hope so, but the broader 
picture is disturbing, as it indicates an ongoing paradigm-shift in the 
Western core countries – primarily in the United States – from state-building 
societies toward risk-societies, in which corporations in cooperation with 
traditional or re-traditionalized communities (Castells /1998/ would say: 
local mafias) break the backbone of Western democracy, based on a 
more intimate relationship between the state and civil society, where the 
state served as a protective shield for the citizens and not as a service for 
big business. The current change brings to mind what medievalist Marc 
Bloch described as an era predating the establishment of the feudal 
orders and kingdoms. The era was full of struggles for survival, in which 
anonymous persons were frequently attacked by bands of robbers, out 
of which the feudal nobility evolved in the High Middle Ages (Bloch 1989).
Still, the current developmental standoff, though discrediting capitalism, 
cannot be used for demonizing it. Both capitalism and (former) socialism 
have significant shortcomings. A minus of capitalism is that it promotes 
the freedom of entrepreneurs, as a natural selection process9, at the 
expense of socio-economic security and prospects of equality. A minus 
of (former) socialism is that it promotes social security under authoritarian 
rule at the expense of freedom (and democracy). By analogy, a minus 
of the transformational paradigm of evolution is that, actually, no society 
undergoes a complete transformation, and a minus of the selectionist 
paradigm is that no society is inclined to endless variation. The best 
theoretical solution should probably reflect real, rather than stylized, 
outcomes, mixtures rather than pure types.
Whether and how liberal and socialist policies of development can obtain 
each other’s virtues, and as such be implemented in international politics, 
is a question that exceeds the scope of this paper. The main tenet of this 
paper is that the state must be a coordinator of developmental policies, 
both on the national and on the global level. Today’s international scene 
is a product of the interaction of nearly two hundred states whose relations 
are contingent upon cycles of globally circulating capital10, rather than 
9 As Joseph Stiglitz emphasizes, “/n/atural selection doesn’t work well, especially when capital markets are 
imperfect — which they always are” (Stiglitz 2010: 164, footnote 59). 
10 Global capital represents, as Jacques Bidet put it, “a form of state centrality” (Bidet 1999).
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bi- or multilateral agreements, whether in economic or cultural exchange. 
In such a configuration, a number of nation-states are subservient to big 
corporations, which act as the new lords who would eventually eliminate 
or subjugate the modern princes, i.e. nation-states as tax-imposing 
instances.11
In contrast, a responsible world government and democratic parliament 
would be more appropriate to keep a balance between the corporate 
interests and the general social interests in development. Such a world-state 
would have control over financial institutions, such as major banks, which 
alone, in their capacity of carrying out independent financial policies, 
have become detrimental to most countries in the world. A financial 
power, which would be consolidated as a central world bank in the remit 
of a responsible world government, may significantly contribute to solving 
the key problem in the human sequence of evolution, namely the survival 
of the fittest or inclusive fitness. In evolutionary biology these terms signify 
the number of offspring an organism produces or supports. Inclusive fitness, 
when translated into Darwinian social theory, means better opportunities 
for the survival of family circles surrounding the wealthiest or otherwise 
most successful individuals in a society. The survivalist “We” is, of course, 
a tiny group. Actually, mankind has never consisted of a single group or 
community, nor was it ever a cosmopolitan multitude. Although modern 
societies have significantly extended We-feelings in some parts of their 
populations, beyond their ethnic or religious boundaries, the magnitudes 
of a modern We, such as EU citizenship, are suspected to retreat to 
old boundaries and borders whenever economic crisis hits society (cf. 
Wallerstein 1990). On the other hand, for a government responsible to the 
whole world, Africa, or any major underdeveloped area, could no longer 
be an extraneous, i.e. some other peoples’, problem. In a cosmopolitan 
state, all important developmental issues are common and part of the 
government’s internal affairs.
Last, but not least, a new public sector may be created in place of the 
old one, which was a residual place in the (Hegelian) triangle between 
Family, Market and State (Hegel 1979). In place of the “tunnel”, through 
which working people pass on the way between their home and their 
11 Consequently, capital evades higher taxes and prefers corporate tax havens such as the Maldives, Kuwait, Ireland, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong - China, Singapore, the U.A.E., etc.
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workplace, the new public sector may diverge the route and become 
an area of regular meetings between different people. Likewise, instead 
of the rise of new poverty, of the “bottom billion” up to the “bottom 
two billion”, so to speak, new policies would knit a global safety-net for 
(temporary) losers in competitive games, in order to make them capable 
of competing again, of course, if they wanted to.
A project of a culturally oriented sustainable 
development
Trends in development theories today – from neoclassical to postmodern, 
and, among the latter, primarily alternative and sustainable development 
theories – are impregnated with melancholy and double bind, particularly 
among radical critics of capitalism. These critics acknowledge that they 
do not have a vision of a society that could outdo capitalism. Instead, the 
alternative imagery recurs to worlds of local communities, preoccupied 
with environmental issues and post-social interests (Knorr-Cetina 1997). 
In general, it seems that communal movements, both communist and 
communitarian, exhibit illusory aspirations vis-à-vis the colossal capitalistic 
Network (Castells 1998).12 At the same time, radical visions – created by 
Amin, Therborn, Habermas, Wallerstein, Touraine, Žižek, and other anti-
capitalist critics – are inadequate as far as the developmental problems 
of (semi)peripheral countries are concerned. What these countries can 
do, that would, at the same time, be acceptable to the core countries, is 
not clear. Instead, the periphery always fails at what the core succeeds at, 
be it in terms of economic efficiency or political democracy. Also, owing 
to its poor skills, with no impact on its developmental outlooks, especially 
in research and development, the periphery looks like a headless body.13
12 Castells’ communal haven is a metaphor that designates the lack of power of virtually all anti-capitalist movements. 
At the same time, he himself acknowledges that he has “exhausted his energy” of imagining a better future. 
Moreover, he maintains that humankind is “socially underdeveloped”, unlike informational technology which, for 
him, is overdeveloped (Castells 1998: 359).
13 This reminds me of some local museums (which I had the opportunity to visit), in which traditional costumes of 
nobility and the middle class were presented on wooden mannequins with heads and faces, whereas mannequins 
displaying the costumes of people from rural areas most often were either head- or face-less.
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Perhaps, the first step in removing the barriers for peripheral development 
is to revise the concept of periphery in order to make it more vibrant 
and susceptible to developmental alternatives. For example, the semi-
periphery, as conceived by Wallerstein (1992), is the analytical concept 
that describes it as a zone which, indeed, is more developed than 
the periphery but, like the periphery itself, is not capable of creating 
an alternative route of development vis-à-vis the core capitalism. In a 
more optimistic sense, a semi-periphery might be a zone of the world 
that combines different types of development policies more easily than 
policies in the core and the periphery, respectively. Likewise, instead 
of its ordinary role, according to Wallerstein’s model, of control over 
peripheries – i.e. servicing the core in such a capacity – the semi-periphery 
might, alternatively, extend its innovative policies of mixing selection 
and transformation, culturally specific forms with universally progressive 
forms of development, to the peripheries. Eventually, an innovative semi-
periphery may influence concomitant changes in the core zone.
To meet the need for alternative designs of development, some 
concepts of sustainable development, especially culturally sustainable 
development, may be appropriate. Within a variety of concepts of 
sustainable development (cf. Neederven Pietrsee 2010; Kassel 2012), 
and culturally sustainable development in particular (cf. Bornshier 2005; 
Radcliffe 2006; Sacco, Blessi and Nuccio 2009), a concept of culturally 
oriented sustainable development is presented in the national document 
Croatia in the 21st Century: The Strategy of Cultural Development 
(Cvjetičanin and Katunarić 2003), which was discussed in the Croatian 
parliament, but was not adopted14, and, thus, could not be implemented 
in the national policy. The main idea of this strategy is closest to the 
assumption that socio-cultural evolution creates hybrids rather than pure 
types. The following quotation from the document illustrates the meanings 
of a culturally oriented sustainable development: “/C/ultural development 
in Croatia should focus on principles of sustainable development. To 
that end it is necessary to mobilize cultural heritage resources and new 
forms of artistic expression; initiate domestic cultural industries; raise the 
level of art education; step out from a strictly delineated cultural space 
14 The document was accepted by a majority vote, instead of a parliamentary consensus, the precondition 
for proceeding with the implementation. In other countries of Europe, as well in Canada, the situation with 
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into everyday cultural life; open up numerous channels of inter-sector 
cooperation; enhance relations towards other cultures; etc. The long-term 
goal of such activities is sustainable cultural development, which implies:
a. increasing the interest of the population in quality products of elite, 
traditional, and alternative cultures,
b. developing needs, the meeting of which will alleviate the strain on 
natural resources and existing capacities of infrastructure and in-
habited areas,
c. strengthening social cohesion and communication outside the tra-
ditional frameworks of social identity and defusing social-Darwinist 
aspirations.” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić 2003: 165).15
In other words, culturally sustainable development stimulates sustainable 
economic development, e.g. slowing down the work and life rhythms, 
by using cultural means, ranging from the artistic design of workplaces 
to traditional customs or new urban practices concerning food, for 
example, which unfold slowly and do not take profit as their primary, or 
their only goal. Surely, owing to the fact that the Croatian strategy has not 
been implemented so far, the whole case may be seen as an argument 
a contrario, demonstrating that developmental policies select policies 
close to pure types or to existing practices favourable to the core – e.g. 
the privatization-marketization-commercialization chain – rather than 
to mixed types. My counter-argument is that the former are detrimental 
to peripheries and semi-peripheries and, in the longer run, to the core. 
Of course, this argument is still hypothetical. Nevertheless, a scientific 
argument should not be based on a fait accompli either, which is a 
variant of the fundamental(istic) belief that the real-existing economy and 
society is the best one at the same time. This is also a tenet of sophisticated 
militaristic regimes, that originates from Plato’s The Republic, in which the 
sophist Thrasymachus defines justice - which is a political version of the 
meaning of truth - as “the right of the stronger” (Plato 1992).
The concept of a culturally oriented sustainable development concerns 
a broad selection of diverse elements of cultural institutions and practices 
15 In the Strategy document, the points a, b and c constitute the elements of the definition of a culturally sustainable or 
culturally oriented development (see also: Cvjetičanin and Katunarić 2012).
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that fit a post-neoliberal and post-statist era, cultural and other policies 
(education, health, housing, employment…). A sustainable economy/
society combines elements of market and state regulation in different 
proportions, adapted to conditions of individual countries, regions, and 
people(s). A sustainable society combines elements of association and 
solidarity with individual independence and competition. Sustainable 
(democratic) politics consist of a triangle of representative democracy, 
meritocracy (parliamentary houses with experts from different areas), and 
basic or immediate democracy (as a corrective of the local and national 
political institutions’ decision-making). Such politics put forward soft rather 
than hard power (resources), by using persuasion rather than coercion. 
Finally, a sustainable cultural and scientific policy combines quality 
products of different cultural and scientific styles, and propagates them 
through education and the media, as well as through popular places of 
public gathering.
Why are hybrids more sustainable than pure types?
By borrowing from, rather than polarizing, the free market and the state-
planning systems, hybridization contributes to organizing development 
in the context of different cultures in the globalizing world (cf. Galtung’s 
renunciation of the opposition between Smithism and Marxism in: Galtung 
1989). Such an understanding of development policies makes possible 
the creation of a sustainable development as a set of different, shifting, 
points or intervals on the scale of developmental policies, between laissez-
faire and state dictatorship (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić 2013: 187-190). A 
sustainable development takes into account both cultural diversities and 
different levels of development. Also, it is a dynamic process, not a fixed 
middle course between the extremes. Simply stated, some individuals 
or organizations are more inclined to competition and uncertainty, 
while others are more inclined towards solidarity and certainty. These 
dispositions are unevenly distributed among different cultures. Some 
cultures are certainty- and others uncertainty-oriented (Hofstede 2002). 
Nevertheless, for the sake of keeping a dynamic balance of development 
in different cultures, both tendencies must find their place on the scale of 
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development policies. Hybrid policies also correspond to the need for a 
personal balance between basic, yet opposed, human inclinations, which 
Rousseau described as amour-propre and amour de soi (cf. Kolodny 
2010), and Riesman as other-oriented and inner-oriented behaviours 
(Riesman 1950).
A (post)modern or high-modern16 society must certainly be organized in 
such a way that people occupy nearly equal positions in a society, and, 
at the same time, are free to choose between more competitive and 
more cooperative relations with others. Sustainability of the conditions of 
equality and freedom are by no means pre-modern values. For instance, 
feudalism and slavery were technically “sustainable” for centuries, which 
is a fact favourable to the selectionist paradigm, as the ruling groups 
were rarely opposed by the subordinated ones (slaves, peasants). Today, 
such a social order cannot be sustainable in the long run (unless the West 
changes its political paradigm profoundly - see above regarding threats 
of “resilience” and protracted wars). Hence, the selectionist paradigm of 
evolution must be complemented with elements of the transformational 
paradigm pertinent to modernity, whether in terms of liberalism or 
socialism. Either way, modern society is, ideally speaking, founded on 
ethical universalism. It is a postulate according to which people can 
adapt their behaviour to, or claim the implementation of universal rules 
(e.g. the ban of homicide), and may want to or be able to transcend 
the real existing social order, based on deepening social inequalities 
and/or on violations of human rights, through reforms or revolutions. Such 
purposive rationality is appropriate for modern societies due to their, in 
Eisenstadt’s words, capabilities of self-correction. Assuming his notion of 
self-correction reflects the core of the Kantian notion of the transformation 
of traditional or particularistic morality into universal/modern morality – 
which is instituted in most modern societies through anti-discriminatory 
legislation. Yet, differences between the de jure and the de facto state 
of universal norms in various countries or regions leaves enough space for 
16 Here, nearly equal meaning is given to both terms because high modernity includes a higher tolerance toward 
differences. The only difference between the two may be that in high modernity universalism has primacy over 
particular values. In any case, post-modernity is not only a temporal category in terms of what follows the end 
of modernity, which really happened, although temporarily, with the rise of Fascism, for example, representing a 
mixture between a cultural tradition, e.g. anti-Semitism in a good part of medieval and early modern Europe, and 
new technologies in weaponry and in the media (e.g. radio). Yet, a more important meaning of post-modernity is 
that it adopts some essential values of modernity - freedom and equality, in the first place - and then insists on their 
“translation” and recreation in different cultural and economic contexts which, admittedly, may make the meaning of 
those values relativistic in a certain measure (for instance, as regards debates about individual and collective rights 
in multiculturalism - cf. Kymlicka 1996). 
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self-correction of current democratic societies.
At any rate, units of a globally sustainable society will necessarily vary with 
regard to the variable importance allotted to institutional spaces for market 
and solidarity - the principles that are pertinent to democracy as such - 
provided that these principles do not exclude each other. Otherwise, if a 
society is ruled exclusively by the free market, or by the prerogative state, 
sooner or later the society will collapse due to resistance of the majorities 
hit by exclusionary policies.
Surely, the idea of achieving sustainability through mixed modalities 
of the allocation of material goods and decision-making powers is not 
entirely new. Max Weber, and long before him Machiavelli, argued that 
some policy areas and some occupational sectors are inappropriate for 
democracy, whereas other areas are not appropriate for oligarchic or 
monarchic rule (cf. Maley 2011). For example, democracy is impractical 
in science and arts, as these sectors are meritocratic by definition. On 
the other hand, issues of social and economic justice, including the 
distribution of income, especially state funding, are inclined towards 
democratic decision-making. At the same time, in modern education, 
mixtures of meritocratic competences (of teachers) and participation (of 
students) are more adequate than meritocracy or educational populism, 
etc. It can generally be argued that the higher a society is developed – 
with an increase of the better educated population – mixed modalities, 
that combine elitism and broad participation, are more appropriate. 
Furthermore, in countries which make attempts at advancing the practice 
of sustainable development, such as most Scandinavian countries, social 
inequalities are smaller than in countries such as the United States or North 
Korea, for example, which deal with pure types of liberal or statist policies, 
respectively.
Last, but not least, hybrid patterns of development would be easier to 
maintain by a world government (e. g. by the United Nations, advanced 
to such a role), than by international contingencies of the laissez-faire 
economies, or by competition between nation-states or blocs of nation-
states. Nevertheless, some nation-states, just like a world government, 
might be faced with regional or local intransigence derived from some 
cultural contrast (e.g. between individualism and collectivism), political 
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extremism or deeper economic gap. Still, it might be easier to govern 
such a huge and diverse landscape, as the governance would take 
place in a world-wide space, in which most units are no longer politically 
divided with regard to the basic principles of freedom and equality, 
where extremes and exclusions are rather rare. In the current international 
arena, consisting of nation-states with unequal powers, where the global 
market economy, run by big corporations, assisted by the governments of 
developed countries, any attempts of establishing global regulation and 
governance are consistently avoided. Conversely, the existing policies of 
development, marked by the expansion of the neoliberal agenda, favour 
the rise of extremes. At the same time, a more balanced global policy may 
have a more favourable impact on less developed countries, and may 
also produce more adequate solutions in politics and intergroup relations 
in general. Such a policy may include different forms of socioeconomic 
development, more or less competitive or cooperative, and democratic 
decision-making (more representative or more basic democracy – with 
more or less meritocracy), and a vibrant cultural life (traditional, /post/
modern or combined), rather than treating non-economic dimensions of 
society as residual or indiscriminate effects of the laissez-fair economy. 
With the growth of such policies the coordinative role of the state will gain 
importance as well.17
In lieu of a conclusion
Finally, I would like to again paraphrase Valéry’s observation from the 
beginning of the paper, this time using the metaphor of a “dancer” as 
proxy for the idea of a culturally oriented sustainable development. Units 
that may jointly produce a global society which is ecologically sounder 
and more sensitive to the needs of other units, should neither “dance” 
without rules nor “calculate” on the basis of their own interests only. The 
latter brings back the Hobessian state of nature, which was reiterated in 
The Communist Manifesto as a false alternative leading to “the common 
17  “/G/lobalization and state growth have gone hand in hand precisely because economic interdependence – or 
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ruin of the contending classes” (Marx and Engels 1848: 2). Rather, a set of 
prudent policies of a culturally oriented sustainable development should 
produce a common habitat for contending parties, compelling them 
to acquire habits of correcting their initial or crude interests into interests 
acceptable to other parties. This would be the result of a dialogue for the 
sake of (Kantian) conviviality. Such an approach to development looks 
like a skilful dancer, who switches to different rhythms when needed. One 
rhythm is prescribed by basic rules and is rather monotonous, while the 
other is rhapsodic and basically improvised, yet both are necessary. This 
evokes the figure of a dancer depicted in T. S. Eliot’s Four Quartets:
“From wrong to wrong the exasperated spirit
Proceeds, unless restored by that refining fire
Where you must move in measure, like a dancer” (Eliot 1943)
By analogy, a culturally sustainable development represents the skill of 
self-reliant movement, acquired through a long process of trials and errors.
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